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Auditor
Responsibility For
Fraud Detection
Dispelling a Myth

By Nancy E. Landahl and L. Lee Schmidt, Jr.

The courts commonly distinguish
between licensing statutes that are
regulatory in character and those
which are enacted merely to raise
revenue. A regulatory statute is one
designed for the protection of the
public against unqualified persons.
The object of such a statute, then, is
to promote the public welfare by per
mitting only persons with the
necessary qualifications to receive
the license.
Over the years, a principle of law
has been fairly well established that
groups licensed for regulatory pur
poses have been allowed to estab
lish their own rules of conduct and
standards of performance that must
be followed in the conduct of the
work for which the license was
granted. While Certified Public Ac
countants perform many varied
types of service to the public, the
only service for which the CPA is
uniquely licensed is the performance
of an audit.
The profession, in section 110.01
of the Statements on Auditing Stand
ards, defined the purpose of an audit
as:
The objective of the ordinary
examination of financial state
ments by the independent audi
tor is the expression of an opin
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ion on the fairness with which
they present financial position
in conformity with generally ac
cepted accounting principles.
The auditor’s report is the
medium through which he ex
presses his opinion or, if cir
cumstances require, disclaims
an opinion.
Since Certified Public Account
ants are licensed through the
auspices of regulatory statutes and
exist for the purpose of promoting
the public welfare, it seems ap
propriate to inquire into the percep
tions of an auditor’s duty as seen by
that public. This paper addresses the
question of what the public expects
from auditors.
Many different groups have at
tempted to speak for the “public”
as the following paragraphs will
suggest.
The opinion handed down in the
1136 Tenants Corporation case had
four points that were made in the
decision that are very important to
practicing CPAs (the decision was
upheld by the New York Supreme
Court):

1. A write-up engagement re
quires certain definitive audit
procedures.

2. Hiring a CPA presumes an
audit.
3. An audit may be adequately
performed without independent
verification.
4. Accountants have a duty to
detect defalcation.
All four of these points in the deci
sion were very disquieting to the pro
fession. The first three points can be,
and are, being adequately dealt with
by authoritative pronouncements
which insure that, when adhered to,
the CPA can effectively limit possi
ble liability through “sound prac
tices.” Points one and two, for in
stance, can be dealt with by having
an adequately constructed engage
ment letter. The Parol Evidence Rule
will not allow oral testimony to con
tradict what is present in a written
contract. Thus, if the engagement
letter says clearly that no audit is in
tended, it would be difficult if not im
possible for the client to say that an
audit was contemplated. Point three
also could be dealt with through the
engagement letter and the new
categories of service — Compilation
and Review — should clearly delin
eate the fact that CPAs can and do
provide different levels of service
that are in the general area of the
attest function. Point four, however,
presents more of a problem since it
addresses a duty of a professional
that is licensed to promote the public
welfare.
In the Equity Funding case, nine
teen or more members of top corpo
rate management perpetrated a
massive fraud. The fraudulent ac
tivities were: 1) creation and infla
tion of assets, 2) borrowing cash
without recording a liability, and 3)
creation of phony insurance
policies. The auditors failed to detect
the fraud. The failure to adhere to
generally accepted auditing stand
ards was held to be gross neg
ligence on the part of the auditors.
Fraud, as defined by the courts, must
usually include a willful intent to
defraud; but in Equity Funding the
courts held that the gross negli
gence of the auditors was equivalent
to fraud. Thus, the auditors were
found guilty of being a party to the is
suance of false financial statements
and were sentenced to jail terms.

In both the Equity Funding and
1136 Tenants’ Corporation cases,
the courts found that the auditors
should have detected the frauds;

however, the Supreme Court
reached an opposite conclusion in
Hochfelder. The fraud was perpe
trated by the president of the First
Securities Company of Chicago. The
president diverted funds for his own
use which customers of the company
had given him. The checks were
made out and addressed to the
president. The president had a “mail
rule” which said that all mail ad
dressed to him was to be opened
only by him. The auditors did not in
vestigate the “mail rule” and they
did not discover the fraud. The fraud
was disclosed by the president in a
suicide note. The defrauded
customers sued the auditors for
negligence under Rule 10b-5. The
court, however, found the auditors
were not guilty under the 10b-5
reasoning that mere negligence
does not constitute fraud on the part
of the auditor. Mere negligence is
the failure to exercise ordinary care
in the performance of a duty, while
gross negligence is the failure to
exercise even slight care.
The Supreme Court, in their ruling
on the Hochfelder case, did not at
tempt to define public policy by
defining or limiting the liability to the
public accountant for failing to
detect fraud. In a footnote to the
opinion, the court did cite the
Ultramares decision but did not use
Ultramares to further explain its
reasoning. In Ultramares, Cardozo
gave this opinion on the auditor’s
liability for negligence:1
If liability for negligence exists,
a thoughtless slip or blunder,
the failure to detect a theft or
forgery beneath the cover of
deceptive entries, may expose
accountants to a liability in an
indeterminate amount for an in
determinate time to an indeter
minate class.
These court cases indicate that
the judiciary is not yet ready to
clearly define how much respon
sibility the auditor should have for
the decision of fraud. The
Hochfelder decision simply stated
that mere negligence on the part of
the auditor is not fraud. The court did
not state whether compliance by au
ditors with the standards of the pro
fession is sufficient to prevent the
auditor from becoming liable for fail
ing to detect fraud.
The informed investor is ap
parently not satisfied with the posi

tion the profession has taken on the
detection of fraud. A 1975 survey2
(taken before SAS 16 was issued)
surveyed corporate financial man
agers, bankers, and financial
analysts. Those surveyed felt that
auditors had a substantially higher
responsibility to detect material
fraud than auditors felt they had.
While auditors felt that their respon
sibility for fraud detection should be
lessened, the informed investors felt
that the responsibility for the detec
tion of fraud should be increased. In
another survey, two-thirds of the
shareholders surveyed felt that the
certified public accountant’s most
important function was to detect sig
nificant fraud. This survey was also
taken before SAS 16 was issued.3
Since these surveys were taken
before the issuance of SAS 16, they
may not reflect the feelings of in
formed investors currently.
In 1974 the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants estab
lished a Commission of Auditor’s
Responsibilities, commonly known
as the Cohen Commission. The for
mation of the Cohen Commission
was an attempt on the part of the In
stitute to respond to criticism about
the auditing profession. The final
report of the Commission was issued
in 1978. The Cohen Commission
concluded that significant percen
tages of financial statement users
consider fraud detection one of the
most important objectives of an
audit. The Commission said that
although in its early years the ac
counting profession had recognized
the importance of detecting fraud,
this recognition had declined in re
cent years. The Cohen Commission
concluded that the audit should pro
vide reasonable assurance that the
financial statements were not
affected by material fraud. The audi
tor has a duty search for fraud and is
expected to detect fraud by the exer
cise of professional skill and care.
In an apparent response to per
ceived public pressure, the following
pronouncement was made a part of
the Statements on Auditing Stand
ards in 1978:
Under generally accepted
auditing standards, the inde
pendent auditor has the
responsibility, within the in
herent limitations of the audit
ing process, to plan his ex
amination to search for errors

The high percentage of
investors who never read the
auditor’s opinion is
disquieting.

or irregularities that would have
a material effect on the finan
cial statements and to exercise
due skill and care in the con
duct of that examination.
The Senate Subcommittee on
Reports, Accounting and Manage
ment, otherwise known as the Met
calf Committee, generally endorses
the recommendations of the Cohen
Commission. Specifically, the Met
calf Committee said:4
The Cohen Commission recom
mended several reforms in the
way auditors for publicly owned
corporations perform their
responsibilities. The recom
mendations were based on a
reaffirmation of the auditor’s
function, which the commission
said is to protect the public’s in
terest against “biases, errors,
and misrepresentations, includ
ing material frauds and illegal
or questionable acts.’’
In a similar but perhaps stronger
statement, the Securities and Ex
change Commission (SEC) has ex
pressed the opinion that auditors
should take more responsibility for
detecting fraud. In 1974, John C.
Burton said:
“Nineteen seventy-four might
be called the year of the audi
tor. The historical position of
the auditor, which seems to be
that fraud is not what the CPA is
responsible for finding has to
be reconsidered. We have seen
too many cases of management
fraud where management has
obscured the reality of the
corporate activity from the
auditor.”5
Former SEC Chairman Harold
Williams, demonstrated agreement
with Burton when he said about the
Cohen Commission:
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“I believe the Commission is
saying that we can’t expect the
auditors to discover every man
agement effort to defraud,
deceive or conceal, but that the
obligation to search is greater
than accountants have
historically admitted and that
the obligation to disclose find
ings is greater than auditors
have anticipated.”6
The SEC thus believes that the
purpose of the independent auditor
is not only to give an opinion on the
fairness of presentation of financial
statements but also to make an effort
to detect fraud. The SEC evidently
believes that fraud detection is an
objective which the profession
should espouse in order to serve the
public interest.
The courts, the AICPA, the SEC,
and other advisory type groups are
imputing or recommending respon
sibilities on the auditor for detecting
fraud based upon their perception of
what the public expects an audit to
be. Since the expectations of the
public are such a driving force, an
effort was made to determine, at
least in one locale, what these
expectations are.
The technique which was used
was somewhat unique for a survey of
this type. Rather than a mail ques
tionnaire, a telephone survey was
undertaken. A significant cloud of
doubt is frequently cast over mail
surveys by persons who speculate
about the motives of those polled
who return the questionnaires.
Typically, mail surveys have a low
response rate which requires a large
sample in order to obtain sufficient
usable replies. In the present survey,
a 100 percent response rate was
achieved because of using the
telephone; therefore the question of
the respondent’s motivation should
not arise.

The Survey
The objective of the survey was to
determine what four different groups
of people surveyed perceived to be
the primary purpose of the independ
ent auditor. The groups chosen
were: financial analysts, account
ants who were not CPAs, managers
and the general public. The popula
tion was the metropolitan Denver
area. This area was chosen because
about half the population of the state
of Colorado resides in Denver. It was
felt that the views of the people of the
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Denver area would probably reflect
the views of Coloradoans as a
whole, though not necessarily the
views of the people of the United
States. The results of the 1970 cen
sus were used to determine the size
of the population and of the groups
within the population. While the
population of Denver has increased
in size since 1970, the census figures
were the best available and were
therefore used to compute the sam
ple size. A statistician was consulted
to assure that the survey would be as
unbiased as possible and to help es
tablish the sample size and evaluate
the results of the survey.
Telephone calls were made until
the predetermined number of people
within each group had been sur
veyed. Some bias may exist in the
survey in that not all the residents of
Denver have telephones. The effect
of this type of bias on the survey is
probably minor. The response rate
on the survey was 100 percent since
calls were continued until the pre
determined sample size was
reached.
The questionnaire was designed
to be brief and unbiased. Brevity was
necessary because people con
tacted by telephone often do not
wish to respond to a long survey.
The questions were designed to give
some background of those surveyed
as well as to determine the amount
of exposure they had to auditing.
The primary objective of the survey
was to determine what the four
groups surveyed perceive to be the
primary purpose of the independent
auditor.
The results of the survey were
evaluated by using the Statistical
Package for Social Sciences com
puter program. Cross tabulations
were performed on the data, as well
as the Chi Square test. Those results
which had a level of significance of
less than .10 were considered
statistically significant and therefore
acceptable.

The Questionnaire
1. Which of the following most
clearly defines your occupation?
a. financial analyst
b. manager
c. non-CPA accountant
d. non-accountant
2. Which of the following most

clearly reflects your level of
education?
a. less than high school
b. high school
c. some college
d. undergraduate degree
e. graduate degree

3. Do you own stocks in any com
panies which are audited by inde
pendent auditors?
4. If the answer to 3 was yes, do you
generally examine the informa
tion contained in the financial
statements, including the audi
tor’s opinion?

5. Have you ever worked for a com
pany which was audited by an in
dependent auditor?
6. In your understanding, which of
the following most clearly de
scribes the primary purpose of the
independent auditor?
a. to detect fraud or theft by
employees and/or manage
ment
b. to give an opinion on whether
or not the financial statements
as a whole are fairly presented
c. to check to see if every trans
action a business had during a
year is recorded properly
d. other — explain
7. Of the four statements in the pre
vious question, which do you feel
should be the primary purpose of
the independent auditor?
In Table I, the results of the survey
are broken down by perception of
the independent auditor’s primary
purpose and occupation of those
who responded.
The first thing noted from the
results of the survey is that a rela
tively small percentage of all the
groups perceive the primary pur
pose of the independent auditor to
be fraud detection. This is in sharp
contrast to what is generally
believed to be the perception of the
public. Secondly, the table shows
that those surveyed who have had
more exposure to auditing because
of the nature of their occupation
have (as would be expected) a better
idea of the auditor’s primary purpose
than those with little exposure.
Thirdly, for the general public, a high
percentage of respondents perceive
the independent auditor’s primary
purpose to be check all transactions.
The second highest percentage
category were those who perceive

the purpose of an audit to be the fair
presentation of financial statements.
These percentages indicate that,
though a significant percentage of
the general public understand what
an auditor does, there is still an ob
vious lack of communication of the
objective of an audit to the general
public.
In order for the accounting profes
sion to serve the public interest, it is
necessary that the accountant’s end
product, the financial statement, be
useful to the public. Some interest
ing statistics were obtained in this
survey about stockholders and the
audited financial statements which
some companies issue (see ques
tions 3 & 4 of the questionnaire). Of
the persons surveyed, 35.3 percent
owned stock in companies which
issue audited financial statements.
Of these stockholders only 36.6 per
cent often read the financial state
ments, including the auditor’s opin
ion. Those stockholders who some
times read the financial statements
and the auditor’s opinion were 14.6
percent of those stockholders sur
veyed. The stockholders who did not
read the financial statements con
stituted 48.8 percent of those sur
veyed. This high percentage of peo
ple who seldom or never read the fi
nancial statements and the auditor’s
opinion is disquieting.
The survey also questioned re
spondents about their perception of
what should be the primary purpose
of the independent auditor. These
results are presented in Table II.
The answers in the other column in
cluded “don’t know” and “give ad
vice” but were too varied to classify
further.
Of those in the first and third
groups listed, a majority felt that the
auditor’s primary purpose should be
to give an opinion on the fairness of
financial statement presentation.
Those in the general public and non
stockholder groups expressed more
fragmented views on what should be
the primary purpose of an audit. For
all groups, detecting fraud was rated
lowest as the primary purpose of an
audit.
The results of a cross-tabulation of
the level of education of the person
surveyed with their perception of the
primary purpose of the independent
auditor are presented in Table III. In
the category titled “Other” the
answers include “give advice,”

Occupation
Perception

Detect fraud
Fairly presents
Check every transaction
Don’t know
Give advice
Other

Financial
Analyst

Manager

Non CPA
Accountant

General
Public

%
0
80.0
0
0
0
20.0

%
7.7
53.8
23.1
0
7.7
7.7

%
14.2
64.3
14.3
0
0
7.1

%
17.9
34.5
40.5
6.0
1.2
0

Table I

Perception of What Should Be
the Primary Purpose of the
Independent Auditor
Classification

Financial Analysts,
Accountants & Mgrs.
General Public
Stockholders
Non-stockholders

Detect
Fraud

Fairly
Presents

Check All
Transactions

Other

%

%

%

%

6.3
14.3
7.3
14.7

56.3
26.2
53.7
24.0

21.9
39.3
29.3
39.3

15.6
20.2
9.8
24.0

Table II

Perception

Detect
Fraud

Fairly
Presents

Verify All
Transactions

Other

Total

%

%

%

%

%

38.5
9.4
20.7

7.7
31.3
41.4

38.5
50.0
31.0

15.4
9.4
6.9

11.2
27.6
25.0

6.1

57.6

27.3

9.1

28.4

22.2
15.5

77.8
42.2

—
33.6

—
8.6

7.8
100.0

Education

Less than
high school
High school
Some college
Undergraduate
degree
Graduate
degree
Totals

Table III

“don’t know,” and answers which
did not fit into the other three catego
ries. There seems to be a definite in
crease in the proportion of those
who correctly perceive the auditor’s
primary purpose according to the in

crease in the level of education.
However, there is not a clear
decrease in the proportion of those
who believe auditors detect fraud
according to the increase in the level
of education.
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Conclusions
The first conclusion which may be
drawn is that more research on the
perceptions and desires of the users
of financial statements is needed. If
financial statement users do not find
the information contained in the fi
nancial statements understandable
and useful, the auditing profession is
failing to properly serve the public
interest. If Congress and the SEC are
overemphasizing the need for
greater efforts to detect fraud, the
desires of the financial statement
users are being misinterpreted. The
goal of the profession should be to
satisfy the desires of financial state
ment users, not the desires of
governmental bodies. The auditing
profession should also be con
cerned that the financial statement
users understand the objective of an
audit. An understanding of the infor
mation contained in the financial
statements must be accompanied by
an understanding of the auditor’s
report. The possibilities discussed
above indicate a need for more
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research in this area on a nation
wide scale.
Secondly, this study focused on
the perception of the primary pur
pose of an audit. Further work
should be done to determine a rank
ordering of various sub-purposes of
an audit including the types of fraud
that are of most importance to state
ment users.
Thirdly, the profession should at
tempt to enlighten the public about
the objectives of the independent au
ditor and the meaning of the infor
mation contained in the financial
statements. There are several possi
ble solutions for this problem. One is
an educational program conducted
by the profession. Such a campaign
could be conducted in the schools or
in the media or both. Another
possibility is to have all audited fi
nancial statements contain a state
ment like the following: “For assist
ance in interpreting these state
ments, take them to a qualified pro
fessional.” A third possibility is to
expressly state in the auditor’s
report that the opinion is based upon
the results of testing and sampling.
Solutions like those above could
help to clarify the meaning of the in
formation in the financial statements
for the public.
Finally, the profession should es
tablish well-defined standards on
the auditor’s responsibility for the
detection of fraud. Auditors need a
standard against which their per
formance can be measured to deter
mine the degree of negligence, if
any, which exists when the auditor
fails to detect material fraud. If the
profession does not set standards in
this area, the courts will set stand
ards for the profession on a case by
case basis.Ω
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